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U.S. AGAIN ASSERTS THAT SOVIET BROKE ARMS AGREEMENTS

By MICHAEL R. GORDON Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 — A Presidential report to Congress on Soviet compliance with arms-control treaties has presented new charges against Moscow and modified some earlier allegations in the light of recently acquired evidence.

The report generally reaffirms earlier Administration charges that there "is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance" with arms-control agreements.

The report repeats Administration charges that a Soviet radar under construction in central Siberia violates provisions of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile treaty and restates an earlier charge that the Soviet Union has violated a provision of the 1979 strategic arms treaty that limits each side to the development of one new type of strategic missile by testing and deploying the SS-25 missile.

Soviet Denies Charges

The Soviet Union has denied the radar violates the treaty and has said the SS-25 is an improved version of the SS-13. The 1979 treaty does allow some upgrading of systems.

An unclassified digest of the report is due to be made public in the coming week and was made available to The New York Times.

The report states that while the purported violations have allowed the Soviet Union to make possible "military gains," some of the violations "are of little apparent military signifiance in their own right."

But the report says that even militarily unimportant violations need to be addressed because they could become "precedents for future, more threatening violations."

Some Compremises

The digest and the report are the product of a sometimes contentious review and its conclusions in many cases represent 'compromises between the State Department, the Defense Department and other officials.

In preparing the report, the Administration rebuffed efforts by Defense Department officials to cast the Soviet violations as part of an "expanding" pattern, officials say.

The issue of purported Soviet armscontrol violations has assumed particular importance because of the continuing debate inside the Administration and in Congress over whether the NEW YORK TIMES 22 December 1985

United States should continue abiding by the 1979 treaty, which the Senate has not approved.

Even though the treaty has an expiration date of Dec. 31, the Administration policy is to abide by the treaty for an indeterminate period.

But President Reagan noted in the unclassified report that the United States is "keeping open all programmatic options" as new United States strategic systems are deployed.

Unless the United States dismantles existing missile launchers, it will exceed a treaty limit when the sea trials of a new Trident submarine occur next May or June.

The unclassified digest, which is based on a classified report to Congress, charges the Soviet Union with nine violations.

Some of the principal charges have been previously made public by the Administration.

But the report also contains new elements.

The report presents a new charge pertaining to the 1979 treaty. It says the Soviet Union has violated treaty provisions by concealing the "association" of the SS-25 missile and its launcher at test sites. This makes it difficult to determine which launcher is used for which missiles.

Sources said this had been done by draping material over the SS-25 missile and its launcher. Officials said the Russians had also been taking steps to hide the SS-24 missile and its launcher, but the evidence in this case was considered weaker.

The report reassesses previous Administration contentions that there was "somewhat ambiguous" evidence that the Soviet Union had "probably" deployed SS-16 missiles at its Plesetsk test range in violation of a provision of the 1979 treaty.

In a reconsideration of this issue, the new Presidential report publicly affirms intelligence reports disclosed by The New York Times that the Soviet Union has probably removed SS-16 equipment from its test range at Plesetsk and says that new equipment "associated with a different ICBM" has been been sent to the test range.

The report also provides the first public Administration discussion on the production rate of the Backfire bomber. In a side agreement to the 1979 treaty, the Soviet Union pledged that the production rate of the Backfire bomber would not exceed 30 planes a year.

Last year's classified report to Congress concluded that evidence suggested that the production rate was still slightly more than 30 a year.

Ambiguous Evidence on Backfire

But the unclassified digest to this year's report says there is ambiguous evidence that Soviet backfire production was "slightly more than 30 per year until 1984" and has been "slightly below 30 per year" since.